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1Introduction
The theme of this paper is the cognitive dimension of institutions (Scott 1995).  By
this we refer to how institutions provide the schemas, scripts, points of orientation,
signposts, etc. that allow agents to coordinate their actions by first coordinating
their beliefs, (expectations, plans, strategies, etc.) (Hayek 1937, Lachmann 1971;
Foss 1996) ¾ what we call ”cognitive coordination.” The main aim is to take steps
towards an understanding of how cognitive coordination may enter into the
theory of economic organization.  This is a huge cherry cake, because a range of
diverse disciplines and fields are involved in the inquiry and because the basic
issues are so very many.  Moreover, the very notion of “cognitive coordination,” as
well as its implications and ramifications, are extremely underdeveloped. Only
recent contributions to game theory offer rigorous treatments of cognitive
coordination (e.g., Crawford and Haller 1990; Geanakoplos 1992; Shin and
Williamson 1996; Colman 1997).  And only recent contributions to organizational
sociology offer, as far we know, good illustrations of cognitive coordination
(Smelser and Swedberg 1994; Scott 199.   In this paper, we draw on both of these
approaches. However, given the limited space available here and the preliminary
state of the discussion, our argument is unavoidably sketchy.  The argument is
roughly the following.
The basic problem in all of economics is that of coordination.  In the
conventional understanding, coordination in a group of agents concerns
maximizing the joint-surplus of their productive activities.1  Coordination problems
exist to the extent that there are impediments to reaching such a state.
Impediments to coordination imply that the first-best (i.e., the best imaginable
                                               
1 Under the usual assumptions about quasi-linear preferences, etc.  See Milgrom and Roberts
(1990).
2allocation) cannot be reached.  Such impediments may take many forms.  They
include moral hazard (Holmström 1982), the hold-up problem (Hart 1995),
opportunity costs of time spent on bargaining (Rubinstein 1982), costs of
monitoring and enforcing an agreement, delay costs, and the costs of not reaching
an agreement when efficiency requires cooperation (Milgrom and Roberts 1990).
Numerous able contributors have erected an impressive edifice on these
foundations under the rubrics of “contract theory,” “mechanism design,” and
“new institutional economics.”
We have nothing to add to these literatures, nor is it our intention to criticize
their specific conclusions and approaches. Rather, we are concerned that
economists of organization may have devoted disproportionate attention to some
kinds of impediments to coordination at the expense of others that arguably are
deeper ones (see also Langlois and Foss 1999).  To put it less mysteriously,
virtually all of the economics of organization assumes that interaction situations
are characterized by heterogeneous (or, “asymmetric”) information but
homogeneous beliefs ¾ and that agents know this. We may say that such
situations are ”cognitively well-defined” (for the agents and the analyst). For
example, agents, strategies and rationality are routinely assumed to be common
knowledge.  It is completely understandable why such assumptions are made:
They enormously ease analysis.  However, there is much point in also analytically
addressing situations that are not cognitively well-defined ¾ as when agents have,
at least initially, ill-founded, contradictory and incomplete beliefs about other
agents, strategies and rationality ¾ and to ascertain how evolved institutions may
remedy the attendant coordination problems.  Arguably, the cognitive
coordination problems caused by differing beliefs are more fundamental than the
coordination problems related to incentive conflicts, because they need to be
solved before the latter category of coordination problems can be addressed.
3Thus, understanding how situations become cognitively well-defined ¾ that is, the
process of achieving cognitive coordination ¾ should be a central analytical task
for economists.
From an analytical point of view, the basic problem is that it is very hard to
say anything definite about cognitively ill-defined interaction situations.
Nevertheless, in the following we shall briefly discuss what it means for an
interaction situation to be cognitively ill-defined, and we shall also speculate on
how an interaction situation becomes better defined. We propose that agents can
overcome cognitive coordination problems through the use of, for example,
precedents that may eventually become institutionalized, and through the
associated analogical reasoning.  Thus, we are taken up with how agents may
evolve various shared cognitive categories that assist them in coordinating their
actions.
Section II discusses the notion of cognitive coordination in basic game
theoretic terms as well as the derived notion of cognitive coordination problems.
Section III then turns to solutions to cognitive coordination problems. Here,
common experience, in terms of focal points, is taken to solve cognitive
coordination problems. Section IV addresses the problem of the cognitive
coordination process ¾ in other words, which focal points may arise ¾ through
discussing the role and costs of analogous reasoning. In order to come up with some
propositions on how cognitively well-defined situations are achieved with the aid
of analogy, section V presents an empirical case ¾ a qualitative account for
analogy-making and coordination between managers in a Danish industrial
district.
4II. Cognitive Coordination ¾ Meaning
In this section, we briefly and informally discuss the notion of cognitive
coordination.  We draw on game theory, because we consider this a natural body
of thought in which to frame the issue.  This is because game theory is at its very
core taken up with interactive beliefs in the form of strategic behavior, and with
analyzing states where cognitive coordination obtains.
Aligned Beliefs in Game Theory
It has often been observed that mainstream economics and most of game
theory assume cognitive homogeneity, that is, people are assumed to classify and
process information in much the same, and typically correct, way (Denzau and
North 1994). Thus, they hold the same (correct) beliefs (Hayek 1937; Young 1998).
Homogeneous and correct beliefs represent a first understanding of cognitive
coordination.  This is because these qualities of beliefs are associated with
equilibrium states.2  However, it is possible to be more explicit about the notion of
cognitive coordination.  Game theory contains a number of concepts that are
useful here.  One such concept is common knowledge (i.e., “A knows that B knows
that A knows … that X”).  Another example is the Harsanyi doctrine, which
roughly says that rational individuals who hold the same information must
independently come to the same conclusion, and that, therefore, no rational person
can expect to be surprised by another rational person (who holds the same
information).  In modern game theory parlance, “consistent alignment of beliefs”
obtains.  Although this is different from common knowledge, it is clearly not so far
from it.  For example, if I know that you know that … etc. I expect it to rain
tomorrow with probability ¾, I know that you know that … etc. you expect it to
                                               
2 For example, in rational expectations equilibrium.
5rain tomorrow with probability ¼, we may infer that we have access to different
information sets, and this in itself should change probability estimates so that, in
the limit, we will end up holding the same probabilities.  In others words, rational
agents cannot “agree to disagree” (Aumann 1976). Taken together,  common
knowledge and consistently aligned beliefs represent precise notions of cognitive
coordination.
Albeit extreme, the assumptions of common knowledge and consistently
aligned beliefs are often helpful, for example, in connection with the analysis of
bargaining games or repeated games in general.  They are particularly useful for
making coordination problems well structured.  They guarantee the analyst that
he does not have to worry about what the players believe about a host of other
variables that might influence the problem, because the players believe about these
is correct and they hold the same correct beliefs. For example, the analysis of
incentive compatibility constraints is certainly made much simpler by this. Thus,
the assumption keeps things manageable, allowing the analyst to proceed in a
piecemeal fashion.
However, for some interaction situations, hyper-rationality alone does not
guarantee coordination (on the Pareto efficient equilibrium) (e.g., Sugden 1989,
1995; Crawford and Haller 1990; Colman 1997).  This sort of argument has mainly
been exercised in the context of shared interest (”pure”) coordination games, such
as symmetric coordination games, asymmetric coordination games or assurance
games (Foss 2001). A shared characteristic of such games is that there are multiple
equilibria. Even taking the usual refinement procedures into account and
assuming common knowledge and consistently aligned beliefs, classical game
theory may have problems predicting which equilibrium will be played.  This is
most obviously seen in the case of symmetric coordination games, where
equilibria cannot be Pareto-ranked.
6Cognitively Ill-Defined Interaction Situations
For many purposes the assumption of consistently aligned beliefs is also
utterly unrealistic.3  Thus, any student of international business is likely to agree (!)
that there is such things as cognitive differences that may persist in spite of people
holding the “same” information (whatever that exactly means).  One is reminded
of the, possibly apochryphical, story about the Japanese supplier firm, committed
to total quality, zero defects management, that unable to make sense of a
requirement from its American buyer of 95 % defect free deliveries sent a
separately boxed batch of 5 % deliberately broken parts and a note saying “We
don’t know why you want these.”  Of course, it may be objected that the beliefs of
the Japanese and the American players will somehow be adjusted.  But that is
precisely the point: The Aumann theorem in game theory that agents cannot
“agree to disagree” should be seen as an outcome of a process of adjustment of
beliefs.  However, it is usually taken as a starting point for the analysis. By starting
from situations that are cognitively well-defined ¾ in the sense that common
knowledge and consistently aligned beliefs obtain ¾ many theorists have defined
away a host of interesting interaction situations.4   By turning away from
cognitively ill-defined interaction situations, theorists sidestep cognitive
coordination problems, and, we argue, thereby lose sight of one of the main
functions of institutions: To stabilize and align beliefs.  However, a number of
theorists do in fact devote attention to the coordination problems caused by
cognitively ill-defined; we turn to this next.
                                               
3 Many game theorists are not too happy about the idea of consistently aligned beliefs, either.
See, for example, Kreps (1990).
4 It is easy to gain the impression that classical game theory solves the coordination problem by
defining it away, that is to say, by assuming that agents by means of pure ratiocination can
reason their way to equilibrium. The exception to this rationalistic approach is, of course,
constituted by evolutionary game theory.
7III. Cognitive Coordination ¾ Problems and Solutions
Repeated Games
Learning in the context of repeated games has lately become a growth
industry in the game theory community (e.g., Crawford and Haller 1990; Young
1998).  It is notable that much of this literature is motivated by dissatisfaction with
the obviously unrealistic assumption that games are cognitively well structured.
Thus, the literature highlights dynamics of adaptation in large populations of
players that are boundedly rational. More specifically, learning rules and ways of
acquiring information are postulated, and this is embedded in a social context.  In
some cases, learning dynamics lead to a number of classical solution concepts
describing the outcomes of interaction between boundedly rational players.  Thus,
this literature predicts that boundedly rational people can actually cope with
coordination problems caused by initially incompatible beliefs.   It directs
attention to simple rules of thumb, derived from everyday experience, as means of
aligning beliefs and hence strategies.
Focal Points
Beginning with Schelling (1960) and Lewis (1969), another, typically more
philosophical, literature has pointed out that classical game theory may assume
both too much and too little about the cognitive capacities of players (Bacharach
1993 and Sugden 1995 are outstanding contributions here).  It assumes too much in
ascribing to players the ability to solve telephone-directory length Lagrangians; it
assumes too little when it requires that ”… rational individuals should ignore as
irrelevant the information that comes to them because they are human beings with
common experiences ¾ the very information they need to use in order to
coordinate their behavior” (Sugden 1986: 90).  Of course, the usual way to capture
such ”common experiences” is to put them under the label of focal points
8(Schelling 1960), and then to treat this as something outside the formal analysis.
The reason for this is that game theory usually excludes all information about how
players themselves describe ¾ or ”label” ¾ their strategies.   But it is this labeling
that allows much real-world coordination to take place.   Of course, the ”labels” of
this literature, the ”distinctions” of Crawford and Haller (1990), and the
”conventions” of evolutionary game theory are all made out of the same stuff,
namely shared cognitive categories.
Common experience shows that ordinary people are perfectly capable of
coordinating their actions in a host of situations even though they may not possess
common knowledge and consistently aligned beliefs. Evolutionary game theory,
the learning in games literature, and the literature on Schelling points give
theoretical substance to this.  But these literatures leave many questions
unanswered.  For example, if a convention institution, such as ”Always play
strategy One,” may begin to emerge as soon as some players for whatever reason
believe that other players will play strategy One, the question is what gives to
those beliefs. Relatedly, the notion of focal point is usually invoked as a sort of
deus ex machina.   Where do focal points come from and how do they arise? We
discuss this next.
 IV. Cognitive Coordination ¾ Processes
Analogy as a Source of Focal Points
We argue that a source of focal points is can be found in agents’ recall of
earlier interaction situations. A focal point arises when agents begin to make
analogy to the same earlier interaction situation. There is evidence from
experimental game theory for this.  In this body of literature analogy is discussed
under the heading of precedent formation and utilization in repeated games, that
9is, how past equilibrium experiences may transfer across games (Knez 1998).5
We may distinguish three categories of situations that give rise to subsequent
focal analogies. A first category consists of situations where basic logical or
practical problems, some of which may date back to the dawn of human evolution,
need to be solved. Some such problems seems to have been solved the same way
throughout human history, giving rise to focal points common to most human
agents, as they make analogy to the same precedent solutions. For example, the
ubiquitous principle of equal division may be a strategy that dates back to a very
basic problem of division of sums  (as Hayek 1973 speculates).  A second category
consists of situations that have given rise to a few, competing, strategies. For
example, given the problem ”pick a number”, primes, or the first number in a
sequence, or the only even number, etc. are likely to be focal points evolved in
coordination situations long ago. But focal points like even numbers are not
universal. Some basic coordination situations have been solved by different
strategies in different groups of agents. The third category comprises the much
more narrowly defined situations where a relatively small group of agents
develop a strategy, which may later be used for coordination purposes by analogy.
The focal points are much more specific and with more limited applicability. For
example, once developed, a principle for sharing social tasks amongst employees
in a small Danish garage may help in preventing conflicts, but may be impossible
to apply with success in an Italian monastery, where the employees have different
                                               
5 For example, in a much quoted study, Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil (1991) examined a
repeated average opinion game, in which players were asked to pick a single number on the
set of integers [1,7], and in which individual pay-offs increase in their proximity to the
median number picked by all the players.  Of course, in equilibrium all players select the
same number. Van Huyck et al (1991) now found that the median action selected in the first
round of play completely determined play in all later rounds.  Hence, although 7 different
equilibria are possible, players stuck to exactly the same equilibrium throughout.  Thus,
players seem to fall back on simple “keep rules that have worked well” heuristics when
confronted with the complexity posed by potential coordination failure.
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personal preferences, work tasks, and family commitments.
The Choice of Analogy
In an interaction situation, an agent is placed in a strategic situation and is
therefore concerned about what the other agents will do.  In some cases he will try
to figure out what analogies other agents may resort to. Thus, there is a higher-
level coordination problem of choosing the same analogy (cf. Sugden 1989: 94).
What, then, determines which analogy is chosen? And how can we explain that in
many cases, the same analogies are chosen by all (or most) agents within a
particular groups of agents, resulting in dominating focal points that may be very
different from those of other groups of agents?  The problem is that a priori
reasoning is not likely to carry us very far here.
V. An Empirical Case6
In order to both illustrate the role of analogical reasoning, as well as to take steps
towards tentative generalizations, we have chosen to turn to the somewhat
unusual strategy of combining game theoretical ideas with a qualitative case
study, so as to let the latter inform the former.  The empirical case presents
examples of cognitive coordination in the Danish furniture industry, illustrating
the role of analogies for economic organization, as well as providing an account
for how analogies are chosen here. It thus provides inspiration for coming to better
terms with the question of coordination processes.   The following case draws
examples from a low-tech industry constituting a particularly interesting example
of coordination: The furniture industry. More specifically, the case goes some way
towards illustrating how coordination problems are solved within one of the
                                               
6 The data in is section is taken from Lorenzen (1998; 1999).
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successful furniture producing and exporting districts of the world: The Danish
Salling district.
Coordination Tasks in the Furniture Industry
The European furniture industry mainly consists of SMEs, due both to
production technology and the predominance of traditional management styles.
Recent globalization of competition has led to only modest restructuring and
consolidation of the industry. Because of the volatility of consumer markets and
growing demands for product varieties and innovations, there is an increasing
pressure on furniture producers to specialize and outsource further. Most
networks of specialized firms consist of independent firms, and there seems to be
little scope for joint ownership or other types of formalized governance. This form
of industrial organization implies particular tasks of coordination.
First, there is a category of tasks related to bargaining. The diversity of
customer demands necessitates many specialized furniture producers to shifting
between particular suppliers, while maintaining a core of dedicated suppliers.
After firms have obtained information on which suppliers have the right
qualifications and capacity at the appropriate time, and judged with whom to
enter into relations, they still face the task of agreeing with their supplier upon
price and quality levels.  Second, there is a category of tasks related to governance.
In order to cooperate, managers need to align expectations with respect to a host of
variables, many of which are not (perhaps cannot) described in contracts.
However, furniture production systems consist of specialized independent
manufacturers. In such systems, there may be larger scope for opportunism and
malfeasance between buyers and suppliers than if all the production units were
under the same ownership.  Unfortunately, within the furniture industry, contract
writing is often inhibited by high costs (both in terms of transaction costs and loss
of the flexibility and speed of delivery, which is so important on furniture
12
markets).
Coordination Problems and Solutions in the Furniture Industry
There is a host of incentive-related and cognitive aspects to these bargaining
and governance tasks.  Concerning bargaining, the solution may be to rely upon
standards. However, great incentive conflicts between firms (and other
stakeholders in the industry) may surface when a standard is to be set. In our
terminology, there is a potential incentive-related coordination problem here,
which may be found within the furniture industry. In the furniture industry, many
local standards also evolve organically rather than being set by a central body.
However, how standards evolve is not a trivial problem. A manager may face a
problem of choosing the same standard as his potential partner.
Concerning governance, the related coordination problems have been given
much attention within the organizational economics literature. For example,
Williamson (e.g. 1975, 1993) ¾ along with most other writers in the field of
organizational economics ¾ argues that the potential coordination problems
related to governance are predominantly related to poorly aligned incentives, and
that such incentives may in turn be aligned through contractual means, or if too
costly, through ownership.  However, because transaction costs economics largely
ignores the cognitive aspect of governance (Langlois and Foss 1999), it has
problems accounting for how transaction costs are lowered within industries like
the furniture industry.  In some of the most successful furniture producing regions
of Europe (notably, the Italian or Danish industrial districts), what drives down
governance costs on the market is perhaps not so much incentive alignment per se.
Rather, it would be more correct to say that managers’ expectations are aligned
through common focal points like social conventions.  In turn, this cognitive
coordination allows for the smooth operation of reputational effects and
contracting which also characterize these regions.
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When such whole groups of agents ¾ some of whom may never have met ¾
have aligned their expectations on the basis of some common cognitive
institutions, social trust may develop. 7 The type of cognitive coordination inherent
in social trust rests upon a mechanism of managers ascribing trustworthiness to
other managers of a particular type (like when a patient trusts a doctor, not
because he knows him as a person, but because he ascribes trustworthiness to
doctors in general). Hence, ascriptive trust essentially rests upon analogy making:
Agents expect the behavior of other agents belonging to a particular social group
to be similar to other members of that group, and these expectations are shared
among agents.  When this is the case, cognitive institutions, in the sense of
generally shared expectations with respect to the behavior of certain types of
agents, exist.
Arguably, in the furniture industry, incentive alignment through contactual
arrangements and reputational effects as a means to lowering transaction costs
cannot take place without some level of social trust ¾ because we cannot expect
managers to commit themselves to sinking costs into their cooperative
arrangements without some initial (aligned) expectations that they will not waste
their investments (Lorenzen 1998).
Regional Competitiveness of the Danish Salling District
Maskell et al. (1998) and Lorenzen (1998; 1999) argue that institutional
endowments of regions determine their specialization and export success with
regards to furniture manufacturing.  Conversely, Kautonen (1998) has explained
the decline of furniture production in the Finnish Lathi region by means of its low
level of social trust, and Kjær (1998) makes a similar argument concerning the
                                               
7 Social trust is thus different from inter-personal trust ¾ where two or more agents meet and
gradually build trust on the basis of their personal experience and/or investments (what
Williamson (1993) calls credible commitments).
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Swedish furniture industry. Arguably, what determines success within the
furniture industry is the ability of managers to solve coordination tasks, and
predominantly those related to cognition.
In the following, we shall outline the case of the Danish Salling furniture
district. Located around the Salling peninsular and Skive town in West Jutland,
the district encompasses a profound and growing agglomeration of specialized
economic activity in Danish terms.8 Here, flexibly specialized small and medium-
sized (SME) furniture firms dominate, reaping external scope, scale, and learning
economies. Managers of furniture producers efficiently solve bargaining and
governance tasks related to maintaining cooperative relations, and we shall
exemplify how this is done on the basis of efficient cognitive coordination. We will
also account for how cognitive coordination has evolved within the district.
The data presented was obtained in the period 1993-1998, through 27 semi-
structured interviews in firms and other local organizations (such as the local
producers’ guild; the technical school; the union; a bank; a credit association; and
the local industrial development agency). The mechanisms underlying the
coordination patterns demonstrated through these interviews were then
                                               
8 In 1996, the seven municipalities of the Salling district comprised more than 54 furniture
producers and at least 2388 employees within this industry. Furniture production made up
33% of manufacture, and 28% of manufacturing employment. The export rate of the firms
within the Salling district is higher than the high Danish average of 80%, and success stories
have been frequent of Salling firms exploring new markets, branding products, and
developing new designs. That the Salling district has in this way taken the lead when it comes
to Danish furniture exports has not only meant growth of some existing producers ¾ it has
also encompassed numerous start-ups of new small firms. Today, in spite of some firms that
have grown to a considerable size, the average size of Salling furniture firms is still small. The
small size of most firms seems not to hinder their economic development ¾ based on their
organizing still new networks aiming at subcontracting, exports, brands, or designs. Thus,
apart form a few large firms, the growth of furniture production in the Salling district is
accounted for by a particular group of firms (roughly, two thirds of the total number of local
firms), with a large ability to cooperate. This section shall focus upon this core group
(“Salling” will from now on refer to members of this group).
15
investigated through in-depth studies of three selected firms.9
Bargaining by Analogy in the Salling District
A first example concerns Salling managers’ solutions to bargaining problems.
The tasks of aligning their interdependencies and design flexible cooperation
practices are solved through relying upon non-formalized and oral standards for
prices, delivery quality, and delivery times.
Where do the focal points encapsulated in these standards come from? Price and
quality levels are set as a part of negotiating processes between single suppliers
and buyers. Because producers spread information in order to make their
suppliers perform better, and suppliers often share price and quality information,
collective standards quickly arise, as all suppliers have to make an effort to
perform so well that their customers do not switch to other suppliers for price or
quality reasons. Standards are regularly adjusted, and hence, cannot be considered
as very stable focal points in themselves. However, the principle of utilizing
standards is quite stable. Even if bargaining problems vary ¾ since, for example,
prices need adjustments more often than qualities ¾ managers label and solve
most bargaining situations the same way, making analogy to how earlier
situations were solved.
Why is this analogy made, and why has the strategy of utilizing standards become a
dominating principle? Clearly, utilizing the standards is an efficient and inexpensive
means of solving a coordination task, and because managers exchange information
and advice to a very high degree, they have taught each other to use them.
                                               
9 The in-depth studies consisted of repeated semi-structured interviews, where findings were
also validated, plus performing on-site observations of the activities of the manager-owners
of the firms during the same week in the fall of 1997 (time studies). This method for the in-
depth studies allowed combining accounts for time expenditures, routines, external contacts,
and information exchanges within the studied firms and between them and their partner
firms with qualitative data on issues such as trust, communication, and cognition.
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Furthermore, as more and more suppliers are forced to comply to standards, and
as more and more buyers rely on standards, the value as a focal point of this
strategy continues to increase.
The twin cognitive problems of arriving at appropriate standards, plus
choosing to use standards at all, are thus solved by social learning processes,
circumscribed by the economic efficiency of using standards; the low information
costs (ease of access) of standards; and social pressure towards complying to
standards.
Governance by Analogy in the Salling District
Even more illustrative for our purpose is to observe how Salling managers’
carry out the coordination tasks of governance. Roughly speaking, they find
themselves in four different categories of interaction situations:
· Downstream situations with agents or retailers (only faced by end producers).
· Upstream situations with non-specialized suppliers.
· Upstream situations with specialized suppliers.
· Horizontal situations.
In the first two categories of interaction situations, producers govern through
contracts, as both retail chains and non-specialized suppliers demand this.
However, the two next categories of interaction situations are excellent examples
of cognitive coordination. Interviewed Salling managers claim that they are not
very keen on the formalities necessitated by writing contracts with agents,
retailers, and non-specialized suppliers (mostly, none of these are not from the
Salling district). In essence, in the vertical and horizontal interaction situations
with local specialized suppliers, they rely on ascriptive trust rather than contracts.
The typical Salling managers expect each other to refrain from opportunism, even
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when no types of non-contractual safeguards (such as credible commitments) are
present.
Where does the basis for ascribing trust come from? The typical criteria for
ascribing trust to another manager is that he follows a particular set of common
local social norms (in essence, they are manager-owners, quality-conscious rather
than price-focused craftsmen, and are local patriots) ¾ plus, importantly, that he
is a local. In particular, the local producers’ guild constitutes an efficient social
group, where reputational effects prevent opportunism and reinforces social trust.
The efficiency of the strategy of ascribing trust, the low costs of the information
needed for ascribing trust according the above criteria (i.e., gossip), plus the social
learning effects within the producers guild are the reasons that this strategy has
become so dominant. In fact, managers use this strategy in both vertical and
horizontal interactions, even if they are very different in terms of products,
standards, and so on. In spite of these differences, Salling managers label vertical
and horizontal interactions between locals the same way, and re-apply strategies
to new situations, i.e. expect each other to base each new deal on ascriptive trust,
and to use the above criteria for trustworthiness. Most of the vertical (supplier)
relationships in Salling are of much older date than horizontal networks. Thus, in
the latter, analogy is made to the former in order to arrive at a governance
strategy.
 Why is this analogy made, and why has the strategy of relying upon ascriptive trust
become a dominating principle? Interviews suggest that the governance strategy
which is predominant in economic networks amongst the Salling managers has in
fact emerged through analogy to informal interaction situations that have for long
taken place in social networks amongst the managers. Ascribing trust on the
account of the common social norms has for more than a decade been a strategy
applied when meeting and making activities in the producers’ guild. In this
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forum, the strategy predates most of the economic networks between local firms.
Up to the 1980s, there were few economic networks between Salling firms, and
they were based on painstaking and slow trust-building processes and placement
of credible commitments. With the expansion of the German market in the 1980s,
the boom in the number of Danish furniture producers, and a larger technological
scope for (and market pull towards) specialization and outsourcing, Salling
managers increasingly began to “demand” trust. As a quicker means of achieving
it, they begun to rely on third-party advice, as colleagues within the producers’
guild shared their positive experiences with other trustworthy members of the
producers’ guild. A particular group of managers among whom recommendations
were frequent and reputational effects high emerged as a consequence. Most of the
managers within this group have now, in need for a means of quickly and cheaply
finding and trusting new partners for (short or long term) cooperative
arrangements, developed a routine of searching for the partner within their own
ranks, and trusting this partner, unless the trust placed in him is abused (which it,
in part due to reputational effects, usually is not). Through social learning, step-
by-step trust-building processes taking place in each individual network have
become superseded by a common (social) ascriptive trust. The market efficiency of
ascriptive trust (it allows firms to quickly, inexpensively, and flexibly coordinate
and thus specialize and cooperate) means that more and more local producers are
willing to experiment with it. Its value as a focal point hence increases in a self-
reinforcing learning process.
VI. Cognitive Coordination: Some Tentative Propositions
Spurred by the empirical case, we now put forward some propositions about the
processes of cognitive coordination. More specifically, we propose answers to the
questions of how and why particular analogies are made, and how and why
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particular strategies come to dominate as a solution to cognitive coordination
problems.  In other words, we go into some detail with respect to identifying the
determinants of cognitive impediments to coordination.  Our central proposition is
that making analogies has both cognitive and information costs, and that they are
balanced with the benefits of strategies in determining the focal points that will win
out, and that this balancing takes place through learning.
Proposition I: Cognitive Costs Influence Analogy Making
First, we suggest that there are cognitive costs of analogy making. Cognitive costs
are fundamental to humans, and are determined not by external factors ¾ such as
the cost of the information available to us ¾, but of the cognitive structures that
we possess ex ante to any cognitive process.  Cognitive costs are the resource costs
of not being able to comprehend and therefore efficiently process information.  It
is different from information costs, which are the resource costs of possessing
certain pieces of information.  Even if a range of information is available to a given
agent, he will make sense of only a subcategory of this, depending upon what he
“scans” for and depending upon his prior knowledge. His incorporation of the
information that he has obtained further depends upon his capacity to process it
(i.e. to combine it with his previously obtained information and preexisting
knowledge). In short, even with an abundance of information, little is obtained,
and even less leads to learning, if it is very different from the information and
knowledge we already posses.10 There is quite some ambiguity in the literature
concerning what cognitive structures consist of ¾ mental capacities, language
skills, etc. ¾ and whether they can be different between agents, can change over
time, and so on.
                                               
10 Cohen and Levintahl (1990) suggest that organizations also have “absorptive capacities”¾
internal structures that determine what they can do with the information that they have
access to.
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However, striking a Kantian chord, some cognitive structures are most likely
dependent the physiology of the human brain (Hayek 1952) and equally apply to
everybody. Therefore, some cognitive costs are ubiquitous. Concerning analogy
making, the similarities and differences (i.e., the degree of isomorphism) between
earlier situations and the present determine the size of the cognitive costs of
making an analogy. This argument is inspired by Weitzenfeld’s (1984)
enlightening discussion of reasoning by analogy. While aimed at understanding
the limits of the use reasoning by analogy in scientific discourse, there is no reason
why its insights should not be transferable (by analogy!) to players engaged in
more mundane interaction. Weitzenfeld makes a distinction between
“homeomorphs” (i.e., analogues of the same kind) and “paramorphs” (i.e., analogues
of different kinds). He points out that valid reasoning by analogy requires that “…
[f]or an inference from some known properties of a particular to other properties,
there must be some determining relations between the properties.  That is, the
properties must be values of variables bound by a non-accidental relation.  This set
of non-accidental relations I call the determining structure of the particular”
(Weitzenfeld 1984 p. 142-3).   It is isomorphism of determining structures that
validates the use of analogy. Thus, we may suggest that in the case of making
analogies across interaction situations, players rely on reasoning which involve
comparisons of determining structures, for example, comparisons between what
they believe are the forms of the relevant situations (e.g., with respect to agents,
strategies, and pay-offs). Because it is incurs fewer cognitive costs to make an
analogy between homeomorphs than between paramorphs, the former may be a
more prominent source of focal points than the latter.11
                                               
11 The Van Huyck et al. (1991) study clearly involved homeomorphs, because the average
opinion games that were considered were essentially identical.  In contrast, Knez’ (1998)
study of precedent transfer from 2 players conflict-of-interest games to 3-persons conflict-of-
interest games involving a (weak) paramorph, since players and pay-offs were different
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The empirical case illustrated homeomorph analogy by Salling managers
who solve both problems of price bargaining and of quality bargaining by
referring to collective standards. Because the price and quality bargaining
situations have same variables (managers), relations between variables
(subcontracting arrangements), and determining structure (e.g. risks and pay-offs),
the analogy is cognitively inexpensive to make. The case however also gave
evidence of linkage of dis-similar situations, namely managers that use a strategy
for finding and trusting a partner by a paramorph analogy to how social life is
conducted within the local producers’ guild.  This analogy is considerably more
cognitively taxing.
Proposition II: Information Costs Influence Analogy Making
That a strategy resting upon a paramorph analogy ¾ thus implying higher
cognitive costs ¾ could become a focal point solving governance problems
amongst Salling managers can be explained by the high market efficiency of the
strategy itself. Ascriptive trust facilitates flexible specialization and has helped
Salling furniture firms in gaining considerable export shares. Furthermore, the
strategy is supported by extremely low information costs, as the information needed
in order to ascribe trust is readily available to the managers as gossip in the local
producers’ guild. This observation on low information costs also applies to the
strategy of relying on price and quality standards: It is easy for local suppliers to
achieve information about the prices and qualities of other local suppliers as this is
shared between managers.
Proposition III: Cognitive Coordination is a Learning Process
                                                                                                                                              
(although the basic game form was the same).   Perhaps not surprisingly, Knez’ results were
also much more ambiguous than those of Van Huyck at al., suggesting the perhaps obvious
point that it is less cognitively taxing to make an analogy between homeomorphs than
between paramorphs.
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While classic game theory simply assumes that in coordination games, agents
reason their way to equilibrium, we wish to offer a tentative explanation that
accounts for the mechanisms of coordination. Thus, we propose that in cognitive
coordination situations, agents can arrive at an efficient balance between
minimizing cognitive costs of analogy making, information costs, and maximizing
efficiency of strategy through experimental learning. Agents can experiment with
applying a strategy that has been applied in earlier situations ¾ if such situations
were similar to the present, the analogy is easily made. If the re-application of this
strategy proves efficient, it is consistently applied. If not, for example because it
proves costly in terms of money, time, or information, agents may experiment
with analogies incurring slightly higher cognitive costs, but with higher efficiency
of the tried strategies.
Proposition IV: Focal Points Become Common Knowledge Through Social
Learning
The empirical case also allows us to suggest an explanation to why a focal
point may become institutionalized within a larger population of agents (i.e., a
community). In this case, all the agents need not rely on their own personal
experience, rather, the learning processes of most of them consist of imitation
rather than experimentation: They imitate the observed successful strategies
applied by others. Through social learning, a common focal point becomes
institutionalized, hence allowing the population ¾ the community ¾ of agents to
coordinate their expectations (Bandura 1977). In communities where interaction
situations are thus cognitively well defined, transaction costs of market-based
forms of organization are often low, as illustrated for the Salling district.12 Social
learning processes seem to function with least effort in communities with frequent
                                               
12 The economic value of low transaction costs in communities with a high degree of cognitive
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interactions between agents, for example, geographically proximate communities
like industrial districts.
VI. Conclusion
By arguing that agents to a very large extent may rely on analogy to earlier
interaction situations in achieving coordinated states, we have provided some
building blocks for a rudimentary theory of the dependence of economic
organization on cognitive coordination. Part of the foundation for economic
organization in a particular firm, market, industrial district, etc., may be the
analogies that are applied in the process of achieving cognitive coordination. We
have inquired into the nature and origins of such analogies through speculation in
combination with an empirical example.  We proposed that analogies that come
up with solutions that are inefficient in the long or short term are most likely to be
discarded.  Further, cognitive costs rising from lack of ideomorphism between two
interaction situations might impede analogy making. The success of coordination
through analogy depends on the extent to which the relevant analogies are
homomorphs or paramorphs.  The more in the direction of paramorphs, the
harder it will be for players to coordinate their analogies, and therefore their
actions.
These suggestions were supported by the empirical case, which also
provided some insights into the emergent nature of coordination processes. The
case suggested that social learning is central for how interaction situations “feed”
into each other. Consequently, we speculated on the scope of such learning
processes.
                                                                                                                                              
coordination is coined in the term “social capital” (e.g., Woolcock 1998).
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If one accepts our reasoning, it is obvious that most of economic theory has
ignored cognitive coordination at its peril.  Assumptions of common knowledge
and the alignment of beliefs make it hard to understand the nature of cognitive
impediments to coordination on the one hand, and how real world people are able
to coordinate their beliefs and actions with reasonable success in spite of these
impediments.   Presumably, the reluctance to relax extreme assumptions is caused
by the difficulty of handling cognitively less well-defined interaction situations in
formal terms.    For this reason, there is very little existing research in the nature of
coordination when interaction situations are not cognitively well-defined. Our
contribution rests upon an unconventional research methodology of combining
theory, speculation, and ideographic insights from a qualitative case study.
Because the issues are so complex here, we feel that this type of research is
justified.  Progress in the understanding of cognitive coordination is only likely to
happen as a result of a close interplay between theoretical work ¾ for example, in
game theory ¾, empirical work and experimental work.  However, to borrow a
phrase, that will be the subject of future work.
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